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The China Sea connects as many coastal states as it divides due to the 
economic and strategic challenges it represents. It also embodies an 
area of confrontations between the Great American and Chinese 
strategies. Identifying with precision the differences that arise, requires 
an interest in the symbolic dimensions that surround them. This angle 
of analysis provides an opportunity to observe the functioning of 
international law and inevitably leads to a discussion of the emerging 
international order. The literature on the situation in the China Sea 
abounds, the singularity of this article is to approach it under the prism 
of the use of international law as revealing the psychology of an actor. 
To carry out this research, the authors use a pragmatic and critical 
approach to international law. The thesis defended shows that, 
contrary to a positivist and judicial approach to international law, 
elements exogenous to the law, the history and the psychology of an 
actor, influence the interpretation of existing norms. 
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On 12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued a notable award on 
sovereignty disputes in the China Sea between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Philippines (Buszynski, 2017; Dupuy & Dupuy, 2013; Loja, 2018; Ma, 2018). The PCA verdict, 
which was unanimously adopted by the judges, denying any legal basis to the nine-dash lines, 
ruled in favour of the Philippine arguments, which confirmed the illegality of the PRC’s claims, 
activities, and conduct in the South China Sea. However, this article will not provide a 
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technical analysis of the reasons given by the arbitral tribunal. Its purpose is to take an interest 
in the symbolic dimension that surrounds them. This angle of analysis provides an opportunity 
to observe the functioning of international law and, in particular, the question of reconciling 
the multiple interpretations of its rules. These equally legitimate interpretations have their 
origin in the contradictions inherent in the international order (Bianchi, 2017, p. 136‑145). It 
is therefore essential to deconstruct what guides the interpretation beyond the formal rules 
laid down by international law. In the case of the South China Sea arbitral award, the Chinese 
position can be understood according to two ideas revealing its state of mind: humiliation 
and a sense of insecurity.  
The humiliation felt by the Chinese from the opium war, which will be discussed in the 
first section, justifies the abundant use of history by the PRC government. In the second 
section, we will propose a reading of the dispute in the South China Sea from the prism of 
Chinese insecurity. In a way far from the positivist and judicial view of the application of 
international law, the feelings and psychology of an actor thus provide a fundamental key to 
the contradictory interpretations of the various protagonists. That is why elements outside of 
the law contribute to a better understanding of international law. These lessons allow us to 
discuss, in the third section, the developments in the international order in the twenty-first 
century highlighted by the arbitral award of 12 July 2016. 
 
Humiliation as a Justification For the Use of Elements Exogenous to the Law 
While one of the interests of the award was to clarify the definition of islands under 
the law of the sea, the core of the dispute, decided by the PCA, was in fact the determination 
of sovereignty over the islands and islets of the disputed area (Pancracio, 2017). Under 
international law, a State claiming sovereignty, whether over land or sea territories, must 
have the capacity to prove the existence of territorial titles. The Chinese argument, despite 
its absence of the procedure, shows the importance attached to history and to China’s place 
in it. This is indicative of China’s representation of itself: a state (empire) whose greatness 
and centrality have been flouted by colonization and which must be restored in the present. 
 
History as an instrumentalized ‘source’ of law 
Paradoxically, at first glance, while China presents itself, in other areas, as an ardent 
defender of an inter-State order based on sovereignty, it would in this case call the 
international order into question by mobilizing history and fait accompli. The PRC’s strategy, 
since the mid-1970s, has been to establish itself in the South China Sea by forcibly taking a 
foothold on disputed islands, organizing aggressive maritime maneuvers, building artificial 
islands and deploying civilian (airports) and military infrastructure (Fels & Vu, 2016).  
Under positive law, the acquisition of a title where there is no clearly established 
document title can indeed be achieved through acts of sovereignty over the disputed 
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territory. These are effectivités, that is to say ‘behaviours which show a certain effective 
control of the disputed territory’ (Kohen, 1997, p. 561). Such effectivités may result from 
legislative, judicial and executive acts (taxes, etc.). In the absence of an indisputable title in 
the disputed territory, judges will then attach legal consequences to a factual situation. 
However, for this fact to become a title, effectivités must be peaceful and public 1. Thus, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejects any idea of fait accompli, i.e. any unilateral change 
created by an occupation of territory by a State in violation of the rights of the sovereign State 
(Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 
par. 121). The case-law of the Court therefore leads to the condemnation of any infringement 
of the inviolability of frontiers, such infringement cannot affect the legal status of the territory 
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), 1986 par. 195). Logically, the Court requires a return to the status quo ante in this 
case. In the Temple of Preah Vihear case, for example, the Court ordered Thailand ‘to 
withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the 
Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962, p. 37). The jurisprudence of the ICJ has thus established as a 
principle that the document titling must always be preferred. This means that the Court will 
always seek the existence of such a title to establish a State’s right of sovereignty. However, 
in the South China Sea, existing sources do not establish the existence of these securities 
(Jacques deLisle, 2017, p. 245).  
The Court’s conclusion therefore applies perfectly to the various Chinese occupations 
in these disputed territories: the PRC illegally occupies a number of islands in the South China 
Sea since it has no document titled and the use of force is inapplicable because it used armed 
force to occupy those territories.   
In order to counter this legal reasoning, and in the absence of a title document that 
solidifies its sovereignty, the PRC will, using the theory of historical titles, argue that in the 
present case there is no violation of the sovereignty of another State since it is the real 
sovereign of those territories (Shen, 2002). The Chinese strategy, in order to demonstrate the 
validity of its sovereignty, is thus aimed at merging historical legitimacy with legal legitimacy. 
In carrying out this merger, its legal discourse uses the principles set out in international 
jurisprudence on land and maritime territorial disputes, focusing on the concept of historical 
rights. 
Since 1947, the PRC has used, for its claims, the so-called 9 traits map. This map 
originated in the 1930s when the Chinese government opposed Western demands in the 
 
1 See the award rendered by Vittorio Emmanuele III in The Guiana Boundary Case (Brazil, Great Britain), ‘in order to acquire 
the sovereignty of a region that is not within the domain of any State, it is essential to carry out occupation of it on behalf of 
the State that proposes to acquire domination; that occupation cannot be regarded as accomplished if not as a result of an 
effective, uninterrupted and permanent takeover in the name of the State, and that the mere assertion of the rights of 
sovereignty, or the manifest intention to make the occupation effective, cannot suffice’, RSA, vol. XI, pp. 21–22. 
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South China Sea (Dutton, 2016, p. 57). However, the legal basis for its claims was never clearly 
stated, as the PRC was merely reasserting its historical rights in and over the disputed area. 
The South China Sea is thus conceived by the PRC as a Chinese lake (Jacques deLisle, 2012, p. 
613). In its claims, however, the PRC uses the concepts of historical rights and historical titles 
without distinction and without defining them. However, these two concepts must be 
distinguished as recalled in the sentence of July 12, 2016. The arbitral tribunal states that ‘The 
term “historic rights” is general in nature and can describe any rights that a State may possess 
that would not normally arise under the general rules of international law, absent particular 
historical circumstances. Historic rights may include sovereignty, but may equally include 
more limited rights, such as fishing rights or rights of access, that fall well short of a claim of 
sovereignty’. For their part, the historical titles relate to historical sovereignty over the 
claimed terrestrial and maritime spaces (In the matter of the south china sea arbitration, 
2016, p. 96 par. 225). 
In the concept of historical rights, title would thus be based on a temporal process 
that would demonstrate the gradual consolidation of power in a territory 2; the legitimacy of 
the title derived from historical, geographical, temporal, social factors would, in a way, 
replace the legal basis of the title (Blum, 1965, p. 100‑101). This is why the Chinese argument 
is based primarily on the archaeology and expeditions of the 15th century Admiral Ming 
Zheng He. These elements would establish, according to the Chinese government and 
academics, that China has recognized and dominated the entire region since the Han Dynasty 
(Jacques deLisle, 2012, p. 617). They also claim that China effectively exercised its sovereignty 
over the disputed islands by organizing naval patrols and expeditions in the region and placing 
these islands under the jurisdiction of local entities under the control of the Chinese provincial 
authorities (Jacques deLisle, 2012, p. 623). 
The Chinese demonstration is complemented by all diplomatic documents showing its 
resistance to foreign claims in the region under consideration throughout the ‘century of 
humiliation’.  Thus, in Chinese discourse, recourse to history would be self-sufficient to 
establish Chinese rights. Chinese legal titles would find their foundation in history, as 
 
2 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal issued at the conclusion of the first stage of proceedings between Eritrea and the Republic 
of Yemen (territorial sovereignty and scope of dispute), decision on 9 October 1998, RSA, 1998, vol. XXII, pp. 209–332, para. 
106: ‘a historic title has another and different meaning in international law as a title that has been created, or consolidated, 
by a process of prescription, or acquiescence, or by possession so long continued as to have become accepted by the law as 
a title. These titles too are historic in the sense that continuity and the lapse of a period of time is of the essence’ and at 
para. 449 ‘The difficulties, however, arise largely from the facts revealed in that history. In the end neither Party has been 
able to persuade the Tribunal that the history of the matter reveals the juridical existence of a historic title, or of historic 
titles, of such long-established, continuous and definitive lineage to these particular islands, islets and rocks as would be a 
sufficient basis for the Tribunal’s decision. And it must be said that, given the waterless and uninhabitable nature of these 
islands, and islets and rocks, and the intermittent and kaleidoscopically changing political situations and interests, this 
conclusion is hardly surprising’. Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p. 
335. 
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interpreted by the PRC, which would establish its ‘obvious’ sovereignty over all of these lands 
and maritime areas claimed in the South China Sea as heir to the Chinese Empire (Shen, 2002). 
The purpose of this article is not to discuss the merits of this speech, although it may 
be noted that its arguments, as evidenced by both international jurisprudence, which rejects 
the idea of ‘historical consolidation of titles’ (Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 2002, p. 303, 
par. 65), and the arbitral tribunal which rejected this vision, do not really win support. What 
is interesting about this speech is its foundation. It is based on an idealized and self-centred 
vision of the history of the region in which the South China Sea would have belonged for 
centuries and, until the arrival of Westerners in the 19th century, to the Chinese Empire. 
However, this interpretation reflects only very imperfectly historical reality. Not only is 
sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea difficult to attribute to one ‘state’ rather 
than another, but above all the Chinese Empire withdrew from the disputed area for a 
relatively long period (from the 16th century) making claims of effectivités difficult (Haiwen, 
2010). 
History is thus instrumentalized in the service of policy predicated in power. The use 
of history by the PRC is indeed a reinterpretation of the past which makes it possible to 
usefully demonstrate the existence of its rights today. To do so, Chinese lawyers select only 
those sources that are favourable to them, ignoring contradictory sources, such as the fact 
that the region is marked by the perpetual challenge of all States bordering China’s positions 
(Hayton, 2017). France, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines protested against the Chinese 
claims of 29 May 1956 on the Paracels and Spratley Islands (Nguyen, 2018, p. 251). 
What appears behind this historical discourse, which serves as the background to its 
legal argument, is the importance of representations, in the geopolitical sense, in China’s 
formulation of its claims. Through them, China sees itself as the natural power of this area. 
The origin of these representations must be found in the traditional Chinese system of tribute, 
which placed the Empire (and now the PRC) at the top of a natural hierarchy allowing the 
maintenance of a regional order. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that Chinese legal 
discourse is based on two pillars, one legal and the other extralegal. The Chinese discourse 
on territorial disputes in the China Sea first assumes all the appearances of a coherent and 
reasonable legal argument based on positive law. However, this is merely the dressing of an 
argument based on history, particularly the period of humiliation experienced from the mid-
19th century onwards. This systematic use of history in its legal discourse suggests that China 
seeks to avoid further humiliation while denouncing those of the past. Such a vision, however, 
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makes it difficult to conceal the instrumentalization of history in order to justify the 
transformation of Chinese vital interests into the source of its international rights. 
 
Revisiting the past, key to understanding Chinese positions 
Understanding the legal positions of each party in the South China Sea cannot be 
complete without taking into account the history of this region and the emotions associated 
with the humiliations of the past, and the sense of insecurity, linked either to the fear of an 
aggressive rise in Chinese power or encircling by American power.  This fear of the PRC for its 
security is largely explained by a desire not to revive the ‘century of humiliation’, which 
represents a period of attack on honour and self-confidence. 
This point is fundamental because it demonstrates that in international relations, 
behind the appearances of discourses based on law motives must be sought, linked to 
‘feelings’ (Popovski, 2016, p. 184‑203). This is what Todd H. Hall calls emotional diplomacy, 
which he defines as ‘[a] coordinated state-level behavior that explicitly and officially projects 
the image of a particular emotional response towards other states’ (Hall, 2015, p. 2). The 
emotional foundations of Chinese legal positions lie in two areas inextricably linked to Chinese 
history and China’s representation of itself: its position as a victim of the West and its desire 
to project the image of a peaceful and powerful state (Coicaud, 2016). It is therefore a certain 
idea of revenge that drives the PRC in the South China Sea (Lowenheim & Heimann, 2008), a 
revenge against the Westerners who have deprived it of its rights by imposing respect for the 
system of Western-European based international law.  
The colonialist origin of the rules applicable in territorial matters explains why 
international law is still sometimes perceived by emerging powers as perpetuating a form of 
colonialism by imposing on them the respect for the ‘rules of the game’ in which they did not 
participate in creating and whose modification proves to be complex; international law would 
thus be a conservative instrument of domination (Anghie, 2014). 
Positions relating to territorial disputes in the China Sea can thus be viewed from the 
perspective of its desire to ‘decolonize’ international law, i.e. to promote a ‘transcivilizational’ 
vision that takes into account all civilizations and cultures in its creation (Onuma, 2017; 
Pahuja, 2011). Indeed, the history of international law shows that international law is first and 
foremost a European law that has become American after the end of the Cold War. The end 
of unipolarity and American hegemony will certainly be reflected in the future in the field of 
international law, for China progressively, as the dispute in the South China Sea shows, affirms 
its willingness to set an alternative vision in this regard to that of the West (Langer, 2018; 
Wang, 2014). If this hypothesis proves to be correct, we could witness significant 
developments in international law. Even if an absolute association between the authors of 
the current Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and the Chinese vision of 
international law would be abusive, it must be noted that the Chinese resort to the main 
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thesis of this current: international law is a right of the dominant (Chimni, 2006). The strategic 
aim of this posture of the defenders of Western hegemony is to legitimize their undertaking 
of revising existing rules (Heritage & Lee, 2020, p. 14). 
The law relating to the determination of borders and the settlement of territorial 
disputes also originated in the era of colonization in the principles of the European 
Westphalian order. This is why the ICJ rejects the theory of ‘historical consolidation of titles.’ 
Moreover, in the South China Sea, due to the application of the theory of timeless law, the 
actions of colonial powers in the 19th Century and the ‘uneven’ treaties led to a redistribution 
of document titles that frustrate the Chinese interpretation (Linderfalk, 2011) 3. The 
Convention on the Delimitation of the Boundary between China and Tonkin on 26 June 1887 
stated, for example, that ‘the islands which are east of the meridian of Paris (by 105° 43’East 
longitude), that is, the north – south line passing through the eastern tip of the island of Ch’a-
kou or Ouan-shan (Tra-Co) and forming the border are also attributed to China. The Gow-tow 
islands (Go-tho, Cô tô) and the other islands west of this meridian belong to Annam 4.’ The 
exclusion of Chinese arguments is, however, the result of a particular vision of international 
law: positivism and its judicial application. 
However, as Professor Yasuaki Onuma writes, international law is not limited to 
judicial use. It plays a role in the social process, especially because culture and representations 
shape discourses that are built on the basis of the words of international law (Onuma, 2017, 
p. 15). The critical current is therefore right to argue that the context (power, morality, 
culture, etc.) is within the law and not outside the law. It is therefore appropriate to unmask 
all its structures (Bianchi, 2017, p. 136–145). 
 
A Sense of Insecurity: A Fruitful Framework for Interpreting the Conflict in the South China 
Sea 
While in the economic field, the PRC accepts jurisdictional settlement of disputes, it 
refuses to do so in territorial disputes. This policy is explained by the symbolic burden 
attached to these disputes, which are directly linked to the state’s sense of security. The 
Chinese refusal to participate in the judicial settlement of the dispute can thus be seen as a 
manifestation of fear linked to the anticipation of an adverse judicial outcome. Similarly, the 
 
3 Arbitral Award rendered on April 4, 1928, by Mr. Max Huber, between the United States and the Netherlands, in the dispute 
over sovereignty over the island of Palmas (or Miangas): ‘A legal act must be assessed in the light of the law of the time, and 
not the law in force at the time when a dispute relating to this act’ (http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/PCA/Ethiopia-
Eritrea%20Boundary%20Commission/Island%20of%20Palmas%20French%20PCA%20final.pdf, p. 16 
4 Convention relating to the Delimitation of the Boundary between China and Tonkin on 26 June 1887, L. de Reinach, 
Collection of Treaties concluded by France in the Far East: 1684–1902 Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1902, p. 300–301. 
 
HASANUDDIN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL SCIENCES (HJSPS) 
   
8 
 
vehement of their response to the sentence is akin to an eruption of anger justified by the 
belief in the injustice of the decision 5. 
 
The triggering fear of the refusal of the jurisdictional settlement of the dispute 
While China bases its foreign policy discourse, almost since the birth of the PRC, on 
peaceful coexistence (Focsaneanu, 1956) 6, and more recently on the need for 
multilateralism, it has refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings initiated by the 
Philippines (Ku, 2016). The existence of a close link between territorial disputes and 
sovereignty leads States to accept jurisdictional settlement only to the extent that it appears 
as a means of mitigating the political costs of possible territorial losses (Allee & Huth, 2006). 
According to Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, recourse to a jurisdictional settlement allows 
governments to conceal land concessions or losses under a jurisdictional decision. It is also 
easier for them to justify them in the face of their public opinion than concessions which 
would have been granted in the context of bilateral negotiations. 
However, these conditions are not met in the eyes of Chinese leaders who reject 
participation in the judicial settlement of the dispute. This refusal is based on two pairs of 
arguments. The first, more legal, explains the rejection of the judicial process because, in the 
eyes of the Chinese, the court’s incompetence with regard to the matter of the dispute and 
the inability of the court to decide the case. This pair of arguments is also consistent with the 
Chinese culture of Li in which the judicial settlement is rejected in favour of a settlement 
between the parties (Pan, 2011). For example, since the beginning of the Twenty-First 
Century, China has negotiated with the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
countries the principle of the settlement of disputes in the China Sea through negotiation. In 
2002, the PRC and ASEAN member States signed the Declaration of Conduct (DOC), which set 
out the principles for the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea. Since 2013, a Code 
of Conduct (COC) has been under negotiation. A single text was agreed in August 2018 and 
forms the basis for discussions between the PRC and the ASEAN States 7. The second set of 
arguments is more political. The exclusion of the judicial remedy is motivated either by the 
State’s distrust of the court or by the inability of the State to monitor the outcome of the 
 
5 The denial of jurisdiction of the tribunal is justified by the very subject matter of the dispute concerning the territorial 
sovereignty of certain maritime formations in the South China Sea, which is not covered by the Montego Bay Convention. 
The refusal is also based on the existence between the PRC and the Philippines of an agreement to settle their disputes in 
the South China Sea through negotiation and the exclusion of ‘maritime delimitation disputes from compulsory arbitration 
and other compulsory dispute settlement procedures’. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 29 
October 2015, paras. 133–139, pp. 45–48. 
6 It is based on five principles derived from the 1954 Treaty on Tibet between the PRC and India. These principles are: mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-mutual interference in internal affairs, equality 
and mutual interests, and peaceful coexistence. 
7 It is based on five principles derived from the 1954 Treaty on Tibet between the PRC and India. These principles are: mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-mutual interference in internal affairs, equality 
and mutual interests, and peaceful coexistence. 
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process in an area of its vital interests (Chang, 2016). Chinese actions in the South China Sea 
demonstrate its strategic importance (traffic control, resources, counter-encirclement by the 
United States) and ‘sentimental’ value for China. Control of the South China Sea belongs to 
its vital interests, as it contributes to the defense and preservation of China's territory, 
sovereignty and history. For this reason, control of the South China Sea is unlikely to be the 
object of compromise and even constitutes a reason for the use of armed force. A judicial 
defeat would have weakened the PRC’s power policy, the assertion of which has become 
increasingly visible since Xi Jinping’s accession to the presidency (Boon, 2014). The 
negotiation of the COC can thus be understood either as an attempt to ensure peace and 
security in the region between regional States that de facto exclude the United States, or as 
a way for Beijing to impose a solution that is favourable to it, excluding any jurisdictional 
solution that might jeopardize its legal interpretations, by ‘soft force’; soft power for the 
Chinese does not in reality mean merely the attraction of ideas, values, but the ‘gentle’ use 
of the material components of power as providing development aid (Chen, 2016, p. 356). 
China does this in three ways. The first is to put pressure on the States bordering the South 
China Sea to abandon or reduce their claims. 
This pressure involves first and foremost a policy of financial benefits for the benefit 
of States that agree, at least in appearance, to conform to Chinese claims. China postulates 
that its economic power forces the States of the region to deal with it. Indeed, as soon as 
Rodrigo Roa Duterte came to power as the new Philippine president, , he did not use the legal 
‘victory’ of the July 12, 2016 arbitration award, preferring to develop economic ties between 
the Philippines and China.  The second is the use of armed force against states that violate its 
‘historical rights’. These military actions range from boarding fishing vessels operating in areas 
considered to be part of the PRC to genuine military operations against States. This is the case 
of Vietnam, which in 1974 and 1988 had to abandon some of the Paracels and Spratleys 
islands it occupied to the PRC. A first lesson in this dispute is that China complies with 
international rules as long as they do not infringe on or interfere with its sovereignty. In this 
way, it is fundamentally in favour of an international order based on a Westphalian vision. 
The protection of its sovereignty sets the limit on its cooperation and thus provides a guide 
to understanding and interpreting Chinese legal positions. Thus, China’s refusal to participate 
in arbitration involving the South China Sea must be understood. This feeling of fear that its 
vital interests will be flouted by a court decision explains China’s reaction to the sentencing. 
 
Anger as a reaction to the feeling of injustice in the arbitral award 
The refusal to recognize the slightest legal effect of the award has been discussed in a 
multitude of articles, since 2016, by Chinese scholars whose thesis is invariable: the court has 
ignored international law (Fu, 2019a, 2019b). Chinese leaders, relying on a Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) argument that judicial decisions are in fact guided by preferences (political, 
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doctrinal, etc.), and the view of the international order of judges (Duncan Kennedy, 1998, p. 
157‑179), have also directly questioned the impartiality of court members accused of being 
inferior and playing the game of the United States. Finally, a major global media and 
diplomatic campaign was launched at the time of the award to reaffirm the rights of the PRC 
in the South China Sea 8. 
This reaction can be understood as a manifestation of the diplomacy of anger which, 
according to Todd H. Hall, consists of ‘an immediate, vehement and open demonstration at 
the state level in response to a perceived offence. It invokes the discourse of indignation and 
threatens a precipitous escalation – even violence – in the face of new violations’ (Hall, 2015, 
p. 4).  Chinese official reactions and articles by Chinese academics show that China wishes, 
through a policy of asserting power, to influence the interpretation of international law.  The 
use of the concept of hegemony, as defined by Martti Koskenniemi as ‘the technique for 
presenting something special (interest…) as a universal (value of the community)’ 
(Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 197), provides invaluable assistance in the deconstruction of Chinese 
legal discourse. The Chinese argument on disputes in the China Sea can be viewed as an 
attempt to alter the philosophy of the law of the sea which has since Grotius been based on 
the freedom of the seas; an interpretation which was favourable to Western maritime 
powers. Chinese arguments, as well as their positions during the negotiations of the Montego 
Bay Convention, expressed their desire for a law of the sea allowing the appropriation of 
maritime areas (Colin, 2016). 
The dispute in the South China Sea thus highlights the articulation of international law 
around major principles (sovereignty, equality, etc.) whose meanings are imprecise. The way 
of articulating them and interpreting them is in itself political. The choices made by States and 
judges are guided by policy or a vision of international law. 
 
The Decision of 12 July 2016, Source of Lessons on The International Order of The Twenty-
First Century 
In addition to these technical contributions, the award of 12 July 2016 is fruitful for 
thinking about the international order of the twenty-first century. Indeed, this award is the 
manifestation, by intervening States, of the confrontation between the United States and 
China to impose their interpretation of international rules in order to establish their power. 
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discourses confront each other to alter international law in favour of its promoters: the 
United States and China. 
 
International law as a Chinese-American ‘battlefield’ 
The study of the arbitral award of 12 July 2016 thus shows the relevance of the theses 
of Martti Koskenniemi and Guy Carron de la Charrière. States use and abuse legal discourse 
in order to justify their conduct under international law. Therefore, it appears more as a 
means of communication, a strategic instrument for States than a real instrument for 
disciplining their behaviour. The essential functions of international law are therefore to 
enable relations between States (relational dimension) and to base their discourse on their 
differences and global problems (discursive dimension). International law is thus a social 
construction resulting from interactions between international and transnational actors 
whose apprehension requires knowledge and understanding of the actors of the international 
system and their formal and informal interactions. It is from them that a true knowledge of 
the rule is born beyond its formal dimension. However, a clear understanding of the practice 
and the formation of international law, which are the result of these interactions, requires, 
contrary to a positivist approach, to give importance to the context (social, historical, 
emotional...). This relational dimension explains the discursive importance of international 
law as a common language for interactions between international actors. Two functions can 
be identified from the relational dimension of international law: a social function (life in 
society) and a ‘legitimizing’ function (strategic).  
In its social function, international law aims, first of all, to prescribe a code of conduct 
dictating their behaviour to members of international society in order to enable their 
coexistence or cooperation (Onuma, 2017, p. 27). This dimension of international law makes 
it possible to structure international society over time by integrating the common interest of 
its members on the basis of the values and objectives defined by them (Allott, 1999). Its 
‘legitimizing’ function, for its part, is intended to demonstrate that the position of an actor is 
in conformity with, or not, the legal norm and/or that it must be accepted in the light of 
fairness, justice, etc. The ‘legitimizing’ function is the discourse of the actors, which can be 
analyzed from two complementary angles. International law is used, first of all, to structure 
the discourse of each actor who dresses their interests with the words of international law 
that base their positions, not on their interests, but on their rights. The law thus serves the 
strategic project of each actor by showing both the legality and the legitimacy of his position. 
Secondly, the actors, by deconstructing international law or a particular norm, aim to 
challenge it as an instrument of the ‘powerful’. 
These two functions clearly appear in the China Sea dispute. International law is 
convened to pacify relations between riparian States and demonstrate the rights of each 
State.  While it is common to argue that international law, as a common language for 
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communication between States, contributes to the prevention of armed confrontations, it 
should be considered that, in the classical Chinese philosophy, taken up by current authors, 
war is not limited to the use of weapons, it is a continuum that encompasses the before and 
after armed confrontation (Sisci, 2008). 
This leads to support, on the one hand, the idea that international law is above all a 
relational element and, on the other hand, that law dresses the interests and positions of 
States within the framework of the rule of law and the Community. These interests and 
positions are based in part on the ‘feelings’ of the state or their interpretation by the 
government. This legal dressing of the interests and positions of States is made possible by 
the indeterminate content of international rules, which makes it necessary to interpret them, 
which, therefore, reveals their content when they are applied. 
The ‘legitimizing’ function raises the question of how the same rule can be mobilized 
by both parties to a dispute. A first explanation would be to recognize that States, in their 
disputes, resort to judicial discourse in order to demonstrate, on the basis of the facts, that 
the rule is favourable to them; this explanation is primarily oriented to the past and is of 
interest only in cases where the case is discussed and decided before third parties. Two other 
explanations may be considered. First, the meaning of the international rule is undetermined 
a priori; its content would then be identified as it is applied in interactions between actors 
and their interpretations of it. This first track would demonstrate the living character of the 
law, but also its shifting character, contrary to the majority view which suggests that the rule 
imposes a priori conduct on States. The second track recalls the drift of the theory of just war 
when theologians recognized that the cause could be just for all belligerents. Applying this 
idea would lead to the recognition that the arguments of both parties are equally legitimate. 
Moreover, this indeterminacy, by allowing each State to legitimately assert its claims, would 
explain, according to Jacques deLisle, that international law not only failed to resolve the 
dispute in the South China Sea, but also constituted part of the problem (Jacques deLisle, 
2017, p. 235–290). 
These two tracks justify recourse to the critical theories of international law, which 
postulate that international law is political in the sense that power plays a major role in legal 
relations and that, in its dialectical dimension, norms do not give the solution, because a 
plurality of answers is possible in light of the legitimate arguments of each. Any 
interpretation, introduction of a legal term or creation of a new norm is a matter of decisions 
made by States and judges, which will have political influence. As Koskenniemi writes, ‘the 
interpretation of legal terms is the political battlefield of States so that their vision is imposed; 
the particular interpretation is presented and is intended to be universal interpretation’ 
(Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 197). Politics thus influences the creation of the law (influence from 
the outside of the law to the inside) and its interpretation, its implementation affects the 
international environment (influence from the inside of the law to the outside). In order to 
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grasp this dual movement, the notion of hegemony as defined by Koskenniemi makes it 
possible to understand and deconstruct the legal discourse of States. 
The Chinese legal argument is thus based on well-established principles to 
demonstrate that it acts according to positive law. In so doing, Chinese discourse takes 
advantage of the indeterminate content of international rules in order to hide its interests 
and denigrate the legal positions of other protagonists (Jacques deLisle, 2017, p. 265). This 
fits perfectly into the vision of a strategic use of law (Lawfare) (Kittrie, 2016). This doctrine of 
Anglo-Saxon origin is, in our view, only a repeat of the thesis developed in 1983 by Guy de 
Lacharrère in his book La politique juridique extérieure, which showed how States use 
international law in their foreign policy (de Lacharrère, 1983); a thesis complemented by 
Robert Kolb, which adds a dimension to foreign legal policy aimed at strengthening the role 
of law in international relations (Kolb, 2015, p. 9). The choice of judicial means can thus be 
seen as a way for States to use the resources of the law to carry out their territorial policy, 
but also as their belief that respect for international norms is a structuring element of 
contemporary international relations. 
The settlement of disputes in the South China Sea is a perfect illustration of the 
development of a certain confrontation between two discourses on international law and 
more broadly on the international order: classical liberalism pluralistic and respectful of State 
sovereignty and normative liberalism imposing a universalism. 
 
The confrontation of two ‘imperialist’ discourses 
The first of these discourses, liberal normativism, is based on the triptych democracy, 
human rights, and the market. It can therefore be regarded as an instrument in the service of 
(Western) Powers whose interpretation of principles would serve to perpetuate a certain 
form of domination according to the critical approach of international law. This conclusion is 
necessary because, as Ronald Dworkin has shown, the law cannot be irretrievably separated 
from morality. 
This conclusion is reflected in the emergence of the liberal-illiberal state/state 
differentiation, which is reminiscent of that made in the 19th Century on the basis of the 
norms of civilization which included or excluded entities depending on whether or not they 
respected European rules. The function is now identical: to stigmatize states that do not 
respect liberal standards. As in the nineteenth Century, this distinction aims to impose rules 
on the world thought out in the West and suggests that the existence of a real international 
community depends on the conversion of all States to liberal ideas 9. Liberal normativism thus 
implies ethical commitments (Dworkin, 2013, p. 455). These would imply, on the one hand, 
 
9   This refers to the idea of the end of history developed by Francis Fukuyama. 
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that the protection of States would derive from respect for certain values and, on the other 
hand, that ‘liberal’ states, in order to achieve liberal peace, would have to act to impose these 
values on other States (Buchan, 2013). It is clear from this vision that the international order 
would be deterritorialized, in the sense that the strict interpretation of sovereignty would 
have given way to a more communal, universal interpretation, that is, based on an identical 
meaning for all civilizations of international principles and norms. 
This perspective, however, omits a divergent understanding of liberalism at the 
international level. To counter this discourse, the PRC proposes an interpretation of 
international law based on both a return to a more Westphalian vision of it governed by the 
principles of peaceful coexistence and respectful of cultural diversity enriched by the 
contribution of classical Chinese philosophy; the challenge of the liberal order normative 
approach by the ‘emerging’ would lead to a real democratization of international law.  
However, this discourse is described as illiberal, that is, based on the role of the State in the 
economy, on a certain protectionism, on a subordination of the individual to the interests of 
the State, on a limitation of his freedoms or at least on a non-increase of individual rights in 
the West, on a return to classical sovereignty, on a reinterpretation of international rules in a 
less Community sense (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016)[1]. The term ‘illiberal’ originates from liberal 
writings, which thus contrasted a ‘good’ international order with a ‘bad’ international order 
that should be combated (Boyle, 2016). Yet, in the ‘classic’ interpretation of the international 
order advocated by the PRC, states are free to determine their political, economic and social 
systems. International law would then be neutral: it would make it possible to reconcile the 
existence of sovereign States. The (macro) neutrality of international law must be understood 
as the absence of a pre-established vision of the international order. Consequently, 
international law should not be normative (impose a vision) or merely express the interests 
of the most powerful. But, being the result of a construction resulting from the practice and 
will of States, international rules cannot achieve (micro) neutrality. This inability is based on 
the fact that they embody the concerns/compromises of the majority or at least the most 
powerful actors. These rules, far from being the work of a common will, would be the result 
of the reconciliation of the wills dependent on the state of international relations (Pan, 2011, 
p. 242). Hence, in a realistic view of international law, which focuses primarily on the 
diplomatic outcome, the PRC’s attempt to impose the interpretation of international rules 
most favourable to its interests. 
To that end, China wished to persuade States to agree with its interpretations by the 
attraction of its model. This acceptance, however, requires a shared vision that assumes the 
expansion of its soft power as an instrument for creating legitimacy. This spread, however, 
requires a culture, political values and a foreign policy that leads to the adherence of other 
States. That is why the PRC presents itself as a pacifist power defending the weakest states. 
The idea of Tianxia (‘what is under Heaven’), proposed by Zhao Tingyang (Zhao, 2019), 
contributes to the rooting of this posture. This thesis illustrates the implementation of a soft 
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power driven by an ideational power understood as the power to impose one’s vision of the 
world through the creation of ideas and concepts that guide the functioning of the 
international order (Onuma, 2017, p. 1).  Tianxia presupposes, in fact, a common choice of 
peoples, and implies the idea of a harmonious world, which translates into the need to adopt 
a pluralistic, transcivilizational vision so that the interests of the world may pass before 
national interests (Tingyang, 2008). Two ideas emerge from this: legitimacy (real and not 
merely formal acceptance of the rules) and the need for a guiding principle, therefore, of an 
ethics. Although Tianxia is moving away by its unitary and non-technical philosophy, it is 
moving closer to the idea of global governance. However, this idea of Tianxia, which would 
lead to global rules, accepted by all, disregards the reality of international law, which is never 
neutral; it is in reality a new imperialism under cosmopolitan externalities. This Chinese 
imperialism is in no way different from the European or American versions of the 
international order. Like it, the Chinese vision of the international order appears as a ‘non-
universal universalism’ (Zerelli, 2001). 
Thus, while China presents itself as a ‘facilitator leader’, that is, a leader who enables 
the achievement of common goals from a win/win perspective, this vision is a rhetoric of 
power. Indeed, leadership involves proposing principles that are accepted or acceptable to 
the greatest number of people to govern international life and the acceptance of certain 
responsibilities in the march of the world (Chen, 2018, p. 39). For the moment, however, 
Chinese international actions (requests for rebalancing, etc.) are focused, above all, on 
satisfying its interests without really articulating a project for and for international society. 
 
Conclusion 
Behind appearances, in reality, both these discourses convey a dominant, nationalist 
vision of the international order. The Liberal discourse is above all a Western discourse which 
has historically justified colonization and then the imposition of an interpretation of 
international norms, particularly through political and economic conditionality. Chinese 
discourse can be analyzed as a return to the classical Chinese philosophy of domination.  
Clearly, these two discourses do not allow for a universal vision of the international order. 
However, they allow us to put forward some lines of reflection in order to understand 
international law differently. 
As a first lesson, international norms and their interpretation cannot disregard the 
study of elements outside the law, whether they be history or feelings. This lesson raises, 
without answering it, the question of whether a universal vision is really achievable. In order 
to avoid nationalist discourse, one possible way would be to accept a pragmatic interpretation 
of international law.  This would lead to an exit from the positivism/naturalistic and 
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idealist/skeptical debates on the one hand, and from the systematic opposition between the 
rules-based approach and the policy-based approach on the other. 
On the basis of the critical lessons of Martti Koskenniemi that international law is 
neither neutral nor objective (David Kennedy, 2009; Koskenniemi, 2007), it must be 
recognized that the aim of the jurist in these circumstances would be to find the most 
acceptable solution in the circumstances of the case; there is not the application of a rule 
defined a priori, but a think about what needs to be done here and now. In view of the 
observation that, under international law, any legal decision is the product of political choices 
(Koskenniemi, 2007, p. 89), Michael J. Glennon proposes using pragmatism in the 
interpretation of that law (Glennon, 2010). The idea is to introduce a specific way of thinking, 
to approach international problems. For this author, the majority of questions in the 
international order and international law are based on cultural diversity, history, economy or 
the search for power or security. The pragmatic approach is designed to identify practical and 
non-ideological solutions. Pragmatism thus promotes an inclusive, non-normative vision, 
without denying the existence of a hierarchy in the international order and the role of power. 
To achieve this, it is necessary to look at opposing conceptions without moralism in 
order to find a balance of interests at stake by reflecting on the direct, indirect, short-term 
and long-term consequences of the chosen solution. This search for balance is based on an 
analysis of the facts with a focus on complex causation, and on the context of the case 
(Glennon, 2010, p. 2‑27).  The advantage of pragmatism is that it is less interested in ideology 
than in problem solving (Schieder, 2000). However, the risk of such a vision is to become so 
arbitrary as to make international law a mere screen of State interests. Even if such a risk 
should not be denied, it illustrates a misinterpretation of pragmatism. Pragmatism can and 
should be based on principles of interpretation in order to avoid arbitrariness; pragmatism 
leads to the search for and application of a (minimal) ethics of international law. Any 
pragmatic approach thus requires clarifying the goals of the actors, of the international order 
and the values/principles that can serve as a guide, since they are acceptable to all (stability, 
justice…) (Wells, 2000). 
In order to reconcile the interests of States and the protection of individuals, the 
interpretation should take into account the consequences of the choices made for 
international security. Since the end of the Cold War, the latter integrates the security of 
States – the protection of its sovereignty in particular against military threats, the classic 
vision – and human security – the emancipation of individuals, the contemporary vision –. 
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